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Regulating Public Pension Fund Investments: 
The Role of Federal Legislation 
Sharon Reece* 
Richard Morrissey & Mary Beth Navin** 
During the first part of the last decade, pension funds both 
private and public were represented as being the nation's 
single largest source of capital.1 Presently state public pension 
funds have accumulated assets in excess of $700 billion.2 The 
most recent projection is that by 1995 state and local public 
pension funds will have assets exceeding $1 trillion.3 
The investment potential of these funds can influence both 
the local and national economies.4 The enormous capital in 
public pension funds has been viewed as a possible remedy for 
distressed state economies,5 and as a source of funds to 
achieve socially and politically desirable policy objectives.6 
Therefore those entrusted with the investment decision making 
of these funds are being encouraged by state political leaders to 
invest in local real estate, the state's infrastructure, and even 
socio-political concerns like businesses started by women and 
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INVESTMENTS, A STUDY OF INVESTMENT PRACTICES AND OPPORTUNITIES: STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA RETIREMENT SYSTEMS (1986); See also James D. Hutchinson & Charles 
G. Cole, Legal Standnrds Governing Investment of Pension Assets for Social and 
Political Goals, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1340 (1980). 
2. Trudy Ring, States Holding Their Health: Study Finds Systems Staying a 
Steady Course, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Oct. 29, 1990, at 21; Sarah Bartlett, 
Economic Scene; States Weigh Use of Pension Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1990, 
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AND ECONOMIC RENEWAL (1981). 
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6. See generally JEREMY RIFKIN & RANDY BARBER, THE NORTH WILL RISE 
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minorities.7 It has also been suggested that pension funds 
could provide a catalyst for economic activity within a 
particular state or region which could take the form of an 
increase "in the availability of mortgages for state residents. 8 
The economic power of pension fund assets has come under 
close scrutiny by policy makers, and a litany of concerns have 
been aired. It is believed that pension funds should widen their 
investment perspectives from the classic legal parameters of 
exclusivity of purpose and the maximization of returns, to 
encompass considerations of responsibilities to the society.9 In 
other words, public pension fund managers are considered 
duty-bound to consider the moral and ethical responsibilities to 
the economy which transcend the parochial focus of 
preservation of capital and maximization of return. The 
argument is that a narrow focus for fund performance denies 
constructive symbiosis of interests, since the growth and 
security of pension funds and public pension funds depend, to a 
large extent, on the sustained growth of the economy. 
Beginning in the early 1980s, public pension funds pursued 
investments that attempted to impact the economy of a specific 
locality or region, and although many states have enacted 
statutes permitting such "targeted investments,"the question 
remains whether such legislation has gone far enough in the 
effort to promote these type of investments. 
The main objective of this study is to examine the current 
legal status of economically targeted investments (ETis) and to 
explore the advantages of a federal tax policy which would 
supplement the States' efforts to promote ETis. To this end, the 
following issues will be discussed: 
Part I -The implications of public pension fund 
investment in ETis. 
Part II -The fiduciary and policy issues under state and 
federal law. 
7. Bartlett, supra note 2, at D2. (Catherine Baker Knoll, the Pennsylvania 
State Treasurer, requested that the Pennsylvania public pension funds invest in 
business started by women and minorities. Pennsylvania public pension funds at 
the time had assets of $25 million.) 
8. See generally LITVAK, supra note 3. 
9. For a recent example of this view, see MARIO M. CUOMO, GOVERNOR, 
REPORTS OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON PENSION FUND INVES'1'MENT: OUR 
MONEY'S WORTH (June 1989); COMPETITIVE PLUS: A STUDY OF THE FEASIHILITY OF 
IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE GoVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON 
PENSION FUND INVESTMENT POLICY (Feb. 1990) [hereinafter COMPETITIVE PLUS]. 
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Part III -The possible role of a federal tax policyt o w a r d s 
ETis. 
I. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC PENSION FUND 
INVESTMENTS IN ETIS 
The term Economically Targeted Investments has most 
recently been defined as investments used to achieve a market 
rate of return at an appropriate risk level while targeting a 
specific public policy. 10 State pension fund ETis typically 
include venture capital, residential mortgage programs, small 
business development programs, commercial real estate and 
the purchase of certificates of deposits from local banks.u 
A. Public Benefits from ETis 
Proponents of ETis maintain that many long-term inter-
ests, which result from a stable economy, are shared by benefi-
ciaries of public pension plans and the community at large. 
These include economic opportunities through assistance to 
small businesses and job creation; the maintenance of a clean 
environment; assistance to economically distressed areas; the 
improvement and expansion of the infrastructure (roads, hous-
ing, health care and educational facilities); and the promotion 
of research and development and technological innovation. 12 
These shared benefits are urged as justification for the 
availability of public pension funds to revive and improve the 
economy. 13 
10. NAPPA Legal Education Conference, June 20-22, 1990 at 26 (transcript on 
file with author); see generally Beverly Ross Campbell & William Josephson, Public 
Pension Fund Trustees Pursuit of Social Goals, 24 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 48, 44 
(198:3). 
11. STATE OF NEW YoRK, COMMISSION ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PENSION AND 
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, IN-STATE INVESTMENTS BY PUBUC RETIREMENT SYSTEMS OF 
THE CITY AND STATE OF NEW YORK (May 81, 1988). 
12. See gmerally INS'TJTUTE FOR FIDUCIARY EDUCATION, ECONOMICALLY TAR<iET-
ED INVESTMENTS: A REFERENCE FOR PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS (Sept. 1989); COMPETI-
TIVE PLUS, supra note 9; Bartlett, supra note 2, at D2; Alfred Rappaport, The 
Stayin!J Power of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1990, 96, 100. 
The survey however reported that less than 4% of ETI programs failed to meet 
benchmark returns; :3::l% met the benchmark standard; 4% exceeded the 
benchmark; 87% did not have results and 22% did not respond. The data reveals 
that of the retirement systems studied 41% had the expected impact and 9% 
exceeded expectations. Fourteen percent had less than the expected effect. 
18. COMPETITIVE PLUS, supra note 9. 
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B. The Return Trade-Off 
In response to investment strategies that diverge from the 
basic goal of providing retirement benefits to plan participants 
and beneficiaries, some argue that such investment deviates 
from the literal strictures of state and federal fiduciary laws 
which reflect the traditional principles of prudence and loyal-
ty.14 In order to appease these concerns, proponents of ETis 
maintain that neither fiduciary standards nor the rate of re-
turn should be compromised when contemplating ETisY The 
representatives of current and future beneficiaries of public 
retirement benefits urge that the sole concern of the fund trust-
ees must be the fund's financial condition and the investment's 
economic yield. Indeed they maintain that public pension funds 
should not be available to subsidize the state, something that is 
the responsibility of the general public. 16 This approach is 
somewhat short-sighted since the beneficiaries of public pen-
sion funds are themselves members of the general public, and 
the ultimate beneficiaries of a healthy economy. Furthermore, 
tax revenues remain available as a safeguard to pay promised 
benefits. Hence there exists an interdependence between the 
fund, its beneficiaries and the state's economy. 
C. Molding the Two: Reciprocity and Inseparability 
ETis may therefore be justifiable on theories of reciprocity 
and inseparability. The public pension systems absorb a large 
share of state and city revenues. A case in point is the city 
contributions which comprise the majority of the total revenues 
funding the New York City Public Pension systems. 17 Indeed 
the state and cities' financial difficulties would clearly affect 
the ability to continue payments to the pension system. The 
security of retirement benefits for public employees (and the 
interests of beneficiaries) is inextricably linked to the state's 
economy and to the taxpayers who remain the ultimate guaran-
tors of public employee retirement benefits. 
14. BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 128-39. 
Hi. COMPETITIVE PLUS, supra note 9. 
16. STUDY COMMITTEE, RETIRED PuBLIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., A RE-
SPONSE TO THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE REPORT ON PENSION FuND INVESTMENT: 
OUR MONEY'S SAFETY (Sept. 1989). 
17. Note, Public Employee Pen;;ions in Times of Fiscal Distress, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 992, 1007-08 (1977). 
101] PUBLIC PENSION FUND INVESTMENTS 105 
There are five major ETI categories; the most common are 
residential housing loans and venture capital. They represent 
approximately seventy-five percent of the reporting retirement 
system's ETis. Other real estate investments, small business 
loans and CD's, private placements and other equity programs 
are the remaining ETI categories and comprise the remaining 
twenty-five percenti8 Current data has indicated that in cer-
tain instances ETI's have achieved their targets while at the 
same time realizing competitive returns. 19 
II. THE FIDUCIARY AND POLICY ISSUES 
UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
A. The Fiduciary Issues 
Public pension funds are governed by the laws of fiduciary 
administration embodied in both state and federal legisla-
tion.20 At the federal level, the Internal Revenue Code of 1991 
(IRC) is the only federal statute to regulate public pension 
funds. In order to qualify for tax favored status, all public pen-
sion plans must comply with certain provisions of the IRC, 
including the requirement that the plan must be for the exclu-
sive benefit of the employees and beneficiaries.21 Compliance 
with, inter alia, the exclusive benefit rule of the IRC confers 
numerous tax benefits on public employees and their pension 
plans. These benefits include exempting pension fund earnings 
from federal income tax,22 allowing employer contributions to 
accrue tax-deferred to the employee23 and permitting certain 
kinds of favorable distribution treatment.24 
1. Compliance with state common and statutory law 
In determining whether to make an ETI, a public trustee 
must also consider the need to comply with state common law 
18. 
19. 
20. 
39. 
lNf>'TITlTTE FOR FIDUCIARY EDUCATION, supra note 12. 
BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 1 at 128. 
I.R.C. § 401(a) (1991). See generally BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 128-
21. I.R.C. § 401(a)(1) (1991). 
22. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1991) provides that "an organization described in ... 
Section 401(a) shall be exempt from taxation ... ." I.R.C. § 501(a) (1991). I.R.C. § 
115 provides that "[g]ross income does not include - (1) income derived from any 
public utility or the exercise of any essential governmental function and accruing to 
a state or any political subdivision thereof .... " I.R.C. § 115 (1991). 
23. I.R.C. § 402(a)(1) (1991). 
24. l.R.C. §§ 402(a)(5) (19~-Jl). 
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or statutory fiduciary rules. The obligations of public pension 
fund trustees under common law standards are measured by 
two prominent rules of trust law: the prudent man rule and the 
duty of loyalty.25 
a. The prudent man and the duty of loyalty 
standard. The common law prudent man rule, formulated in 
1830 in Harvard College v. Amory,26 requires the trustee "to 
observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence man-
age their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in re-
gard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering 
the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capi-
tal to be invested."27 These rules were elaborated on in the 
1869 New York case of King v. Talbot/8 which provided that 
the trustee must act with "sincere and single intention to ad-
minister the trust for the best interest of the parties benefi-
cially interested, and according to the duty, which the trust 
imposes."29 
b. The prudent investor standard. Six states have adopt-
ed the prudent investor standard as opposed to the prudent 
man standard.30 The prudent investor rule requires, 
the exercise of reasonable care, skill and caution, and is to be 
applied to investments not in isolation but in the context of 
the trust portfolio and as a part of an overall investment 
strategy, which should incorporate risk and return objectives 
reasonably suitable to the trust.31 
The revisions have two major effects. First, the formulation of 
the basic rule gives more latitude for exercise of judgment by 
the trustee than had been thought permitted by the formula-
tion that it replaces, with particular emphasis on a specific 
investment's position in the trust's portfolio and overall strate-
25. RES'TATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170, 227 (1959); see generally LARRY 
M. EH;, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE MAJOR PENSION AND 
RETIREMENT PLANS FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE FIFTY STATES (June 6, 1980). 
26. 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1831). 
27. !d. at 461. 
28. 40 N.Y. 76, 85 (1869). 
29. ld. at 85-86. See also Ormiston v. Olcott, 84 N.Y. 339 (1881); Coyne v. 
Weaver, 84 N.Y. 386, 391 (1881); Matter of Weston, 91 N.Y. 501, 511 (1883). 
30. The six states which have adopted an updated rule of prudent investing are 
California, Delaware, Georgia, Tennessee, Minnesota and Washington. RESTATEMENT 
(THIHDJ OF TRUS'TS General Notes, at 70 (Proposed Final Draft 1990). 
31. RES'TATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (Proposed Final Draft 1990). 
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gy rather than viewing it in isolation.32 Second, revisions in 
the prudent man standard allow "expert trustees to pursue 
challenging, rewarding, nontraditional strategies when appro-
priate to the particular trust."33 
ETis may represent one of the nontraditional investment 
strategies which the prudent investor standard was designed to 
accommodate and might be appropriate for public pension 
funds. The prudent investor rule also does not make any in-
vestment imprudent per se.34 As pointed out in the comments 
to the Restatement 3rd of Trusts, social or political consider-
ations "may properly influence the investment decisions of a 
trustee to the extent permitted by the terms of the trust or by 
consent of the beneficiaries."35 By allowing the consideration 
of social factors the prudent investor standard appears almost 
to support public pension funds desiring to invest in ETis. 
2. The role of ERISA 
Some statutes specifically incorporate the fiduciary rules of 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA).36 However, public pension plans are regulated by 
ERISA only to the extent the relevant statutes specifically 
incorporate ERISA's fiduciary rules. 37 The fiduciary rules set 
forth in Section 404 of ERISA have three main elements: The 
exclusive purpose rule,38 the prudent man rule39 and the diver-
sification requirement.40 The exclusive benefit rule of ERISA 
(to the extent ERISA is incorporated in state statutes), and the 
exclusive purpose rule of the IRC present a challenge to the 
public plan investor. ERISA's concept of prudence requires 
32. RES"''ATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS Forward (Proposed Final Draft 1990). 
33. RES"''ATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS Introduction (Proposed Final Draft 1990). 
34. ld. 
35. RES"''ATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227, General Notes, at 78 (Proposed 
Final Draft 1990). 
36. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 
Stat. 829 (1974). The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 
as amended, regulates private pension plans and specifically exempts governmental 
plans from its coverage. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1991). 
37. An example of a statute permitting ETis but relying on ERISA fiduciary 
rules is Arkansas. ARK. CODE ANN. § 24-3-41la (Michie 1989). Fiduciaries of public 
retirement systems are required to conform to the prudent investor rule as inter-
preted and defined by ERISA. 
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1991). 
39. 29 U.S.C. § l104(a)(1)(B) (1991). 
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(C) (1991). 
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fiduciaries to act "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence 
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man 
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would 
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with 
like aims . . . "41 
In essence, these standards require the plan fiduciaries to 
discharge their duties "solely in the interest" of participants 
and beneficiaries and for "the exclusive purpose" of providing 
participants and beneficiaries with retirement benefits.42 This 
requires that pension funds be held and administered with 
complete loyalty to the exclusion of all other interests and with 
undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries of the trust. A literal 
interpretation of the legal constraints would seem to preclude 
ETis. However some observers have concluded that ERISA's 
fiduciary rules permit trustees of pension funds to take into 
account collateral and incidental benefits to participants and to 
the society in making investment decisions.43 
3. The incidental benefit concept 
Courts have also endorsed the incidental benefit concept. 
In Donovan v. Bierwirth,44 the court held that the exclusive 
benefit rule was not violated where the trustees action inciden-
tally benefitted nonparticipants.45 The hope is that ETis will 
have an incidental benefit effect, assist specific targeted com-
munities, possibly where beneficiaries reside, and also assist in 
the rejuvenation of the state's economy. 
An analysis of the interrelationship between ETis and the 
exclusive benefit rule is largely academic where ETis generate 
market or in excess of market rate of returns. However where 
ETis have a higher than normal risk and do produce less than 
the market return, the absolute prohibition of the duty of loyal-
ty and the exclusive benefit rule proscribes the investment 
even if a targeted group or the state's economy could be assist-
ed by the investment. Without a relaxation of fiduciary rules, 
public pension funds could make no sacrifice of return without 
41. See 29 U.S.C. § l104(a)(l)(A) (1991). 
42. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(B) (1991). 
43. Ronald B. Ravikoff & Myron P. Curzan, Social Responsibility in Investment 
and the Prudent Man Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). For an opposing 
viewpoint see Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 1. 
44. 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982). 
45. ld. 
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violating fiduciary obligations. This possibility could strike the 
death knell for ETis during periods in which they can be most 
beneficial. In fact, participants are also unprotected if the toler-
ance of a sacrifice in violation of the exclusive benefit rule 
contained in the IRC, results in the loss of tax-exempt status. 
Therefore the relaxation of the rules to permit a carefully delin-
eated sacrifice threshold for the permitted percentage of public 
pension funds that can be the focus of ETis, also protects the 
participants. The degree to which the fiduciary rules should 
accommodate such relaxation, should be left to the legislatures 
in the same way that statutes carve out a percentage of public 
funds that can be used for ETis. 
B. The Policy Issues 
A relaxation of fiduciary rules in the context of ETis will in 
fact protect the beneficiaries from the tax impact of the viola-
tion of the fiduciary rules. ETis may realistically entail some 
sacrifices from a risk/return analysis, and ETis by their very 
nature have a dual mission. This differs from traditional in-
vestments which focus solely on a risk return analysis. Their 
goals are different and therefore the standards governing them 
should reflect this difference in order for ETis to have their 
own "imprimatur." When ETis are being contemplated, the 
debate should address the possibility of higher risks and the 
possibility of less than market return. There is no current pre-
cedent allowing sacrifices in the context of ETis. 
The infusion of public pension funds to bolster a state's 
economy can be accomplished either ( 1) during a period of fi-
nancial distress as a therapeutic measure or (2) systematically 
as a possible prophylactic approach. Economically targeted 
investments are more systematic and maintenance-orientated 
and hence emphasize the latter approach to a state's chronic 
economic condition. 
1. Pension funds as a therapeutic measure 
In Withers v. Teacher's Retirement System,46 public pen-
sion funds were used as a therapeutic measure when New York 
City's economy was facing imminent disaster. In Withers, retir-
ee beneficiaries of the New York City School Teacher's Pension 
Fund, the Teacher's Retirement System (TRS), challenged the 
46. 447 F.Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), a{fd, 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979). 
110 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 6 
decision of the plan trustees to purchase $860 million of New 
York City Bonds as part of a plan to thwart the imminent 
bankruptcy of New York City in late 1975. The TRS trustees 
acknowledged in testimony that although the purchase was a 
legal risk, bankruptcy, and its inevitable sequel, was not a 
tolerable alternative, and therefore, on balance, the purchase of 
the highly speculative bonds was justified. 
The court upheld the trustees' action even though the 
bonds bore such a high risk of default that they would not have 
satisfied the prevailing prudent person standards, and the 
excessive purchase may have even breached the duty to diversi-
fy. The Withers court, however, justified the TRS purchase on 
the grounds that the trustee's major concern was protecting the 
source of the plan's funding, that is the city itself. 
Although the court in Withers declared that the sole inter-
est of the beneficiaries motivated the decision and neither the 
protection of the jobs of the city's teachers nor the general 
public welfare were factors which spurred the trustees in their 
investment decisions,47 the inseparability of the interests of 
the economy and that of the beneficiaries precluded the inter-
ests of the beneficiaries from being the sole objective of the 
investment decision. In recognition of the potential violation of 
the exclusive benefit standards, legislation specifically permit-
ting the investment and relaxing the fiduciary rules was enact-
ed.4s 
The rationale of the Withers case may not be directly appli-
cable to ETis since the Withers case arose in the context of an 
emergency. The response in the Withers case represents ather-
apeutic approach which included court-ordered use of the public 
pension funds coupled with distress legislation both at the 
federal and state levels to legitimize the investment. 
2. Pension funds as a systematic approach 
ETis are designed to provide a program of systematic in-
vestment of a portion of public pension funds in a state's econo-
my as a possible prophylaxis against economic disaster. Relax-
47. ld. at 1258-59. 
4R ld. at 1260 (upholding Act of March 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-2:36, 90 Stat. 
2:1R and Act of Oct. 21, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-497, 92 Stat. 166.5. The statutes 
essentially provided that if the New York City Employees Retirement System 
(NYCERS) purchased Municipal Assistant Corporation (MAC) bonds, such action 
would not violate I.R.C. § 401(a)). 
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ation of the application of the exclusive benefit rule was al-
lowed in Withers when the public plan's source of funds was 
tethering on bankruptcy. It seems that explicit legislation 
would be necessary to justify the systematic program of ETis 
outside the context of imminent bankruptcy. 
Hence, there are no objective guidelines to determine the 
level of danger on a continuum of decline in a state's economy 
that will justify a court's decision that an investment to pre-
serve the state's economy is prudent, albeit risky. Therefore, 
reliance on a court order may not be a viable strategy. The sys-
tematic investment of a limited percentage of assets by public 
pension funds in ETis should not only be encouraged but 
should receive explicit sanction under the rules of loyalty and 
prudence. ETis could be prudent investments provided fund 
managers determine that they are not excessively risky, would 
not result in radically reduced returns and would benefit tar-
geted communities, while protecting the ability of the state to 
ultimately provide the promised retirement benefits. The fact 
the ETis may not always provide the same risk and return as 
traditional investments must be specifically addressed and 
accommodated. 
a. Accommodating less than market returns under a sys-
tematic approach. In Brock v. Walton,49 the court held that 
although ERISA trustees were required to charge a reasonable 
rate of interest on loans to pension plan participants, an inter-
est rate below market rate did not violate that directive. Some 
facts that were central to the court's decision include the fact 
that the trustees researched interest rates thoroughly before 
making the decision, sufficient safeguards like mortgage insur-
ance were in place, and the loans were a small part (less than 
ten percent) of the fund's portfolio. 5° Likewise, a below market 
rate for ETis may be defensible where the investments are 
thoroughly screened and represent a de minimis part of a 
fund's portfolio. Adequate safeguard lies in the taxing power 
available to assist public funds in meeting their obligation to 
provide retirement benefits. 
b. Other considerations under a systematic 
approach. Currently, the interrelationship between ETis and 
the fiduciary rules remain unclear. It is difficult, indeed im-
possible, for a trustee to safely reconcile the responsibilities of 
49. 794 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1986). 
50. Id. at 588. 
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the duty of loyalty while at the same time maintaining sensi-
tivity to the economic condition of the state.Statutory authority 
to consider a more diversified menu of investment options and 
objectives, including ETis coupled with adherence to the tradi-
tional fiduciary concepts, are contradictory and pose a real 
dilemma. On the one hand, specific legislative encouragement 
is granted to consider state economic development in the in-
vestment decision making process. On the other hand, ETI 
proponents maintain that these investment objectives in no 
way compromise the traditional legal investment standards of 
prudence and loyalty (the exclusive benefit rule). 51 
In the 1980s, New York State encouraged its public pen-
sion funds to invest in the State's economic growth.52 How-
ever without legislative certainty concerning the application of 
the fiduciary rules to ETis, such investments may be more 
risky from a legal perspective. 
Permissive legislation promoting ETis may not achieve the 
desired goals without some liberalization of the exclusive pur-
pose rule within a narrow context. Since violation of the exclu-
sive benefit rule under the IRC may lead to loss of tax-exempt 
status which will impact on the beneficiaries themselves, a 
federal policy towards ETis should be addressed in the IRC. All 
parties will benefit from a clear definition of the applicability of 
the fiduciary rules with respect to the percentage of public 
pension funds which some states permit for ETis. The exclusive 
benefit requirement precludes consideration of the health of the 
state in investing public pension funds. Therefore, statutes 
should provide that in making ETis, a fund trustee's consider-
ation of the economic health of the state will not necessarily 
violate the exclusive benefit rule. Clarification of the fiduciary 
standards was deemed necessary to justify certain risky invest-
ments to maintain the economic viability of New York City.53 
Such legislation would be even more imperative for systematic 
ETis. Statutes that permit ETis but maintain that the tradi-
tional standards of prudence and loyalty must be adhered to 
can therefore operate at cross purposes to create uncertainty in 
the investment process. 
The exclusive benefit rule should be modified to accommo-
51. See COMPETITIVE PLUS, supra note 9. 
52. See N.Y. RETIRE. & Soc. SEC. LAW § 177{7) (McKinney 1987). 
53. N.Y. RETIRE. & Soc. SEC. LAW § 179(a) (McKinney 1987) (declaring MAC 
bonds to be a prudent investment). . 
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date the permitted percentage of ETis contained in many stat-
utes. Such modifications would create legal certainty if consid-
e_rations of the economic health of the state are considered per-
tment and are used as criteria for public fund investment. This 
would also protect the fund manager if the ETI results in a 
sacrifice in terms of economic return on the investment. 
C. Implication of These Factors for The Internal Revenue Code 
Certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code reinforce 
the common law fiduciary principles that apply to public pen-
sion plans. The tax benefits that flow to the beneficiaries of a 
public pension plan are conditioned on the plan being main-
tained for the exclusive benefit of the employees or their bene-
ficiaries. 54 The Treasury Regulations reinforce this mandate 
by providing that "'purposes other than for the exclusive benefit 
of his employees or their beneficiaries' includes all objects or 
aims not solely designed for the proper satisfaction of all liabili-
ties to employees or their beneficiaries covered by the trust."55 
An Internal Revenue Service ruling has interpreted the 
exclusive benefit rule to permit some collateral benefit to oth-
ers provided the investments have the primary purpose of ben-
efiting employees or their beneficiaries.56 The ruling however 
requires that: the cost must not exceed the fair market value at 
the time of purchase; a fair return commensurate with the 
prevailing rate must be provided; sufficient liquidity must be 
maintained to permit distributions in accordance with the 
terms of the plan; and the safeguards and diversity that a pru-
dent investor would adhere to are present. 
Although it may appear that economically targeted invest-
ments which meet the requisites of the aforementioned ruling 
would not run afoul of the exclusive benefit rule of Section 
401(a), revenue rulings do not have the authority and general 
applicability of a statute or regulation. In addition, ETis may 
not always measure up to the conditions of the ruling even 
though they may be justifiable from an economic perspective. 
Investing money in long term projects at a rate of return that 
may not be commensurate with the risk in the hope that im-
provement of the local economy indirectly benefits plan benefi-
fi4. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1991). 
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(a)Ul) (1991) (emphasis added). 
56. Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2 C.B. R8. 
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ciaries may compromise the "primary purpose" standard of the 
ruling. In addition, most public pension plans are under-fund-
ed57 and therefore do not maintain sufficient liquidity to per-
mit distributions in accordance with terms of the plan at all 
times. It is not enough for ETis to be pursued with the notion 
that such investments will not be challenged. Amendments are 
necessary in order for ETis to be pursued in a secure and cer-
tain context. 
In 1975 and 1978, when the New York State and City pen-
sion plans were in jeopardy, investments beneficial to the City 
posed a threat to the tax-favored status enjoyed by participants 
and beneficiaries, and consequently accommodating legislation 
was enacted.58 In order to bring investments within the exclu-
sive purpose rule of section 401(a) federal legislation made it 
clear that purchasing the securities issued by New York City 
and the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC) for the City 
of New York, was not violative of the exclusive benefit rule of 
section 401(a). 59 Similar legislation is needed to promote and 
legalize systematic uses of ETis. 
Ill. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REQUIRE 
PUBLIC PENSION PLAN INVESTMENT IN ETis 
In analyzing the effects of a federal tax policy to promote 
ETis, certain constitutional issues must be addressed. The 
principal federal regulations applicable to state and local gov-
ernment pension plans are those contained in the Internal Rev-
enue Code. Tax-exempt status is conditioned on adherence to 
these rules. In general, the disqualification of a pension plan 
results in the employer losing immediate deductibility of contri-
butions to the plan. The trust income then becomes taxable, 
and employees are taxed on employer contributions made on 
57. Alicia H. Munnell, The Pitfalls of Social Investing: The Case of Public 
Pensions and Housing, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Sept./Oct. 1983, at 20 (citing 
LITVAK, supra note 3). 
58. Such special legislation was enacted in 1976 and in 1978. Act of March 19, 
1976, Puh. L. No. 94-236, 90 Stat. 238; Act of Oct. 21, 1978, Pub. L. No. 9fi-497, 
92 Stat. 1665; The statutes provide that if certain New York State and City 
pension funds, including NYCERS, took certain action they nevertheless would not 
be deemed to have failed to satisfy the requirements of § 40l(a) or to have en-
gaged in prohibited transactions under § 503(b) of the IRC. These actions include 
entering certain securities purchase agreements and purchasing, under such agree-
ments, securities of the City and MAC. 
59. Act of March 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-236, 90 Stat. 238; Act of Oct. 21, 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-497, 92 Stat. 1665; 
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their behalf to the extent they are vested. A public plan's tax 
qualification status, however, essentially only benefits only 
participants and beneficiaries, because States and their instru-
mentalities are not subject to direct federal taxation.60I t i s 
axiomatic that tax exemptions and deductions are matters of 
"legislative grace,"61 and a form of tax subsidy,62 which no 
citizen can claim as a matter of constitutional right. If the exer-
cise of the taxing power is itself constitutional, an exemption 
from the tax conditioned on compliance with Congressional 
mandates that are not in themselves constitutionally offensive 
would a fortiori be constitutional.63The issue to be discussed 
in this section is whether Congress can constitutionally link the 
portion of public funds designated by states as acceptable for 
ETis to its tax qualification status. Congress would be regu-
lating the investment of ETis by using its taxing power to cre-
ate an incentive for such investments. This would depoliticize 
the issue at the state level and be of uniform applicability. 
The power of Congress to tax and spend for the general 
welfare is plenary.64 "Congress ... has a substantive power to 
tax and to appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it 
shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare .... "65 
Not only does the power to tax "reach[ ] every subject" (except 
exports),66 but also Congress has "especially broad latitude m 
creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes."67 
[l]n taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures 
possess the greatest freedom in classification .... [T]he pre-
sumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the 
most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile 
and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and 
classes. The burden is on the one attacking the legislative 
60. I.R.C. § llli provides that gross income does not include "(1) income derived 
from any public utility on the exercise of any essential governmental function and 
accruing to a state or any political subdivision thereof ... " I.R.C. § llli (1991). 
61. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 485, 440 (1984); see also 
Commissioner v. Sullivan, 856 U.S. 27, 28 (1958). 
62. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 511, n.6 (1988); Regan v. Taxation 
with Representation, 461 U.S. li40, li44 (1988). 
6~j. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 501i (1988). 
64. U.S. CoNST. a1t. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also New York v. United States, 826 U.S. 
572, 582 (1946). 
61i. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1986). 
66. New York v. United States, :j26 U.S. 572, 575 (quoting License Tax cases, 
72 U.S. (li Wall.) 462, 471 (1866)). 
67. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1988). 
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arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might 
support it.68 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains 
an equal protection component that limits federal legislative 
classifications in much the same manner as the Fourteenth 
Amendment restricts the States.69 But the Supreme Court has 
consistently upheld statutory classifications that are rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental purpose if they neither 
burden fundamental rights nor discriminate against suspect 
classes. 70 
Income, whether deferred or not, is a legitimate object of 
federal taxation "without apportionment" and "without regard 
to any census or enumeration.'m The tax linkage contemplat-
ed in the proposal at issue would presumably not interfere with 
a state employee's exercise of fundamental rights any more 
than any other income tax does. Nor have state employees ever 
been held to constitute a suspect class. In fact the risk of pen-
sion benefit default is lower for state public employees than for 
their counterparts in the private sector,72 and the power to 
tax can be exercised on behalf of the public pension plan. Un-
der traditional Equal Protection analysis then, the inquiry 
would be simply whether the classification was rationally relat-
ed to a legitimate governmental purpose. 
These differences favoring public plans could present a 
significant basis for a Congressional decision to expose a por-
tion of public pension funds to a slightly higher degree of risk 
in their in-state investments in order to impact on a state's 
68. Id. at 547-48 (quoting with approval Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-
RR (1940)). 
69. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (19fi4); see also ReRan, 461 U.S. at fi42; 
Schweiker v. Wilson, 4fi0 U.S. 221, 226 n.6 (1981). 
70. Regan, 461 U.S. at 547; see also Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. :j60 
(1988); Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340 (1986); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 
230 (1981). 
71. U.S. CoNST. amend. XVI; see also United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 
(1973); Howell v. United States, 775 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1985); Zweiner v. Comm., 
743 F.2d 273 (fith Cir., 1984); Hogan v. United States, 51a F.2d 170 (6th Cir), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975). As stated earlier, no one has a constitutional right to 
a tax exemption. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 525 (1988) (holding 
that owners of state bonds have no constitutional entitlement not to pay taxes on 
income they earn from state bonds). 
72. See Hogan v. United States, 513 F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 
U.S. 836 (197fi) (finding rational basis for distinguishing federal civil service 
pension plan from private sector plans in the statutory commitment of the govern-
ment to pay retirement benefits). 
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economy. Linking the tax-favored status and tax subsidy of a 
percentage of funds designated as permissible by the states for 
ETis can be justified as rationally related to the legitimate 
federal governmental purpose of ensuring the continued fund-
ing of state and local pension plans, and the security of a finan-
cially stable retirement for a significant part of the population. 
A federal policy reflected in using the current tax subsidy to 
create an incentive for public plans to commit a portion of their 
tax-free eamings to ETis will ultimately benefit the plan par-
ticipants. 
Although a tax is primarily a means of securing revenue, 
the power to tax can involve a power to regulate. The taxing 
power can serve as a basis for governmental regulation with 
taxes serving as the sanction behind the regulatory scheme. 73 
The mere fact that a tax has a regulatory purpose and effect 
would not, without more, render it unconstitutional.74 
The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."75 The 
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on Tenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence is to be found in Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority.16 
In Garcia, the Court overruled the decision it reached in 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 77 and held that the Fair 
Labor Standards Act wage and hour provisions could constitu-
tionally be applied to the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, a local government entity. 78 In doing so, the Court 
rejected "as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a 
rule of state immunity from federal regulation that tums on a 
judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental func-
n. United States v. Sanchez, :340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950); Mulford v. Smith, :307 
U.S. :3R, 48 (19:39). 
74. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 527 n.16 (1988); Steward Machine 
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937); see also Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 
87, 9R n.13 (1969); Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44; Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 
506, 513 (1937). But see Child Labor Tax Care, 259 U.S. 20 (1922). "Every tax is 
in some measure regulatory." Steward Machine Cu., 301 U.S. at 589 (quoting 
Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513). 
75. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
76. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
77. 426 u.s. 8:33 (1976). 
78. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555-56. 
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tion is 'integral' or 'traditional."'79 The Court reasoned that 
the principal limitations on Congressional authority to regulate 
state activities must be found in the structure of the federal 
government itself.80 Absent a showing of some extraordinary 
failure of the national political process, "[s]tate sovereign inter-
ests are more properly protected by procedural safeguards 
inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicial-
ly created limitations on federal power."81 
The Tenth Amendment, by itself, would apparently not 
pose an insurmountable hurdle to the proposed use of the cur-
rent tax subsidy for public pension plans. 
In the recent case of South Carolina v. Baker,82 the Court 
rejected a Tenth Amendment challenge to a federal tax on the 
interest earned on long-term publicly offered state bonds issued 
in unregistered form. 83 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Brennan recognized that the purpose of the tax was to combat 
federal tax evasion "by providing powerful incentives to issue 
bonds in registered form."84 For the states, the incentive to 
issue bonds in registered form would presumably lie in the fact 
that the interest earned on registered bonds would remain 
exempt from federal taxation. Therefore, the bonds could be 
sold at a lower rate of return.85 South Carolina argued that 
because this incentive was so powerful, the statute denying 
exemption had to be treated "as if it simply banned bearer 
bonds altogether without giving States the option to issue non-
exempt bearer bonds."86 The Court agreed. In its Tenth 
Amendment analysis, it assumed that Congress had "directly 
regulated States by prohibiting outright the issuance of bearer 
bonds."87 But even assuming direct Congressional regula-
tion, Justice Brennan found "nothing in Garcia or the Tenth 
Amendment [that] authorizes courts to second-guess the sub-
stantive basis for congressional legislation."88 
The contention of the National Governor's Association 
79. !d. at 546-47. 
80. !d. at 550-52. 
81. !d. at 552. 
82. 485 U.S. fiOfi (1988). 
8:3. !d. at filfi. 
84. !d. at fiU9. 
8fi. See id. at fill. 
K6. !d. 
87. !d. 
88. !d. at .~l:j. 
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(NGA) did not fare any better. The NGA argued that the stat-
ute was "invalid because it commandeer[ed] the state legisla-
tive and administrative process by coercing States into enacting 
legislation authorizing bond registration and into administering 
the registration scheme."89 
FERC v. Mississippi, 90 a case decided before Garcia, had 
"left open the possibility that the Tenth Amendment might set 
some limits on Congress' power to compel States to regulate on· 
behalf of federal interests."91 In FERC, the Court rejected a 
Tenth Amendment challenge to a federal statute that effec-
tively required state utility commissioners to adjudicate federal 
rights, and either to consider the adoption of a variety of rate-
making standards in accordance with federal notice and com-
ment procedures or cease regulating in the field. 92 In the 
majority's view, the central rationale for the decision lay in the 
fact that the field of utility regulation was pre-emptible.93 
Therefore, the fact that Congress conditioned continued state 
regulatory activity on compliance with federal requirements 
would not invalidate the act. 94 The Tenth Amendment was not 
implicated merely because Congress chose to allow the States 
to continue regulating in an otherwise pre-emptible area.95 
Justice Brennan was able to distinguish the situation in 
Baker from that in FERC on the grounds that the statute deny-
ing tax exempt status to unregistered bonds was in effect a 
direct regulation of state activities, and thus did not comman-
deer state regulatory machinery.96 As such, it did not at all 
implicate the residual Tenth Amendment question left open in 
FERC. 97 The fact that state statutes had to be amended or 
that state officials had to implement a new registration system 
did not rise to the level of a commandeering of the state legisla-
tive and administrative process.98 These were merely "inevi-
table consequence[s] of regulating a state activity."~9 Since the 
R9. Id. 
90. 456 U.S. 742 (19R2). 
91. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. at 505, 51::! (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 
456 U.S. 742, 761-64 (1982)). 
92. FERC, 456 U.S. at 769-771. 
9:1. Id. at 769 n.:12. 
94. !d. at 76fi, 767-68 n.:;o. 
9fi. Id. at 76fi-71. 
96. South Carolina v. Baker, 48fi U.S. fi05, 518 (1988). 
97. See id. 
9R. ld. at fi14-1fi. 
99. Id. at 514. 
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statute at issue in Baker had already survived analysis under 
the standard set forth in Garcia, it was constitutional under 
the Tenth Amendment. 100 
Under the analysis used in Garcia, Baker, and FERC, the 
proposed use of tax-exempt status could arguably survive a 
Tenth Amendment challenge. The proposal to condition tax-ex-
empt status of public funds on the investment of a portion in 
ETis is a direct regulation which ultimately benefits the state 
and federal governments. Even if the proposed tax were 
deemed so coercive that it would be assumed to constitute a 
direct regulation of state activities, the same result might fol-
low under Baker. There is no doubt that the power to regulate 
commerce already includes the power to extensively regulate 
public and private pension plans. 101 Even if a statute that 
links tax-exempt status of those portions of public pension 
plans designated by states as reasonable for economically tar-
geted investments could survive constitutional scrutiny, the 
proposed tax must be analyzed under the doctrine of intergov-
ernmental tax immunity. 
Until recently it was thought that the doctrine of intergov-
ernmental tax immunity absolutely precluded the federal gov-
ernment and the states from taxing the incomes of the other's 
officers and employees. 102 The power of the federal govern-
ment to tax the incomes of state employees is no longer in 
doubt. 103 However, that power is not unlimited. Generally, 
intergovernmental tax immunity still bars taxes that are levied 
"directly on one sovereign by the other or that discriminate 
against a sovereign or those with whom it [deals]'. 104 
The purpose of intergovernmental tax immunity is "to 
protect each sovereign's governmental operations from undue 
interference by the other."105 As Justice Frankfurter stated in 
100. See ld. 
101. See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986). 
102. Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466 (1939); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 
Wall.) 113 (1871), overruled by Graves v. New York 306 U.S. 466 (1939); Dobbins 
v. Commissioners of Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842). 
103. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 40fi (1938), overruled by New York v. 
United States 326 U.S. fi72 (1946); C(. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 
U.S. 466 (1939) (upholding state tax on federal employees). 
104. Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 811 (1989) (emphasis 
added); see al;;u South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, fi23 (Hl88). 
105. Davi;;, 489 U.S. at 814. See also Graves, 306 U.S. at 481; M'Culloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435-36 (1819). 
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New York v. United States 106 : 
[T]he fact that ours is a federal constitutional system, as 
expressly recognized in the Tenth Amendment, carries with it 
implications regarding the taxing power as in other aspects of 
government. Thus, for Congress to tax State activities while 
leaving untaxed the same activities pursued by private per-
sons would do violence to the presuppositions derived from 
the fact that we are a Nation composed of States. 107 
The importance of the non-discrimination principle was 
most recently illuminated by Justice Brennan. 
The nondiscrimination principle at the heart of modern inter-
governmental tax immunity case law does not leave States 
unprotected from excessive federal taxation-it merely recog-
nizes that the best safeguard against excessive taxation (and 
the most judicially manageable) is the requirement that the 
government tax in a nondiscriminatory fashion. For where a 
government imposes a nondiscriminatory tax, judges can term 
the tax "excessive" only by second-guessing the extent to 
which the taxing government and its people have taxed them-
selves, and the threat of destroying another government can 
be realized only if the taxing government is willing to impose 
taxes that will also destroy itself or its constituents. 108 
In fact, every case upholding federal taxes on state activities or 
employees has expressly relied on the non-discrimination prin-
ciple embodied in the intergovernmental tax immunity doc-
trine.109 
In the recent case of Davis v. Michigan Department of 
Treasury, 110 the Supreme Court had occasion to reaffirm the 
contours of the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. In 
Davis, a federal civil service pensioner brought suit to recover 
state taxes paid on his federal retirement benefits. 111 At the 
106. 326 u.s. 572 (1946). 
107. ld. at 57fi-76 (citations omitted). 
108. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 525 n.15 (1988). 
109. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (upholding non-dis-
criminatory federal tax on interest derived from unregistered state bonds); Massa-
chusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978) (upholding non-discriminatory 
federal registration tax on state owned civil aircraft); New York v. United States, 
326 U.S. fi72 (1946) (upholding non-discriminatory federal tax on mineral waters 
sold by state). 
110. 4H9 U.S. HO:i (19H9). 
111. !d. at H06. 
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time, the State of Michigan taxed all retirement benefits, ex-
cept those paid by the State or its political subdivisions.u~ 
The Court of Claims denied relief, and the Michigan Court of 
Appeals affirmed. 113 It rejected the pensioner's claim that the 
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity prohibited the dif-
ferential tax treatment of federal retirement benefits, and in-
stead, upheld the discriminatory tax under a rational basis 
test. 114 
Writing for seven other members of the Court, Justice 
Kennedy began his analysis by noting that civil service retire-
ment benefits are deferred compensation. 115 Therefore, the 
former federal employee could claim the benefit of the statutory 
immunity from discriminatory taxation embodied in 4 U.S.C. § 
111. us He then went on to find that the "immunity in § 111 
is coextensive with the prohibition against discriminatory taxes 
embedded in the modern constitutional doctrine of intergovern-
mental tax immunity."u7 
Michigan launched two arrows against this constitutional 
attack. It first asserted that the pensioner was not entitled to 
claim the immunity because there was no showing that the tax 
"interfere[d] with the Federal Government's ability to perform 
its governmental functions, [and thus] the constitutional doc-
trine ha[d] not been violated."u8 While the Court recognized 
that the immunity doctrine exists to protect governments, it 
rejected out of hand the State's argument that "individuals who 
are subjected to discriminatory taxation on account of their 
dealings with a sovereign" could not on that ground alone claim 
the immunity. 119 "Indeed," wrote Justice Kennedy, "all prece-
dent is to the contrary."120 The Court saw "no reason for depart-
ing from this settled rule."121 
Next, Michigan argued that significant differences between 
the two classes of pensioners justified the discriminatory treat-
ment. The State first suggested that the tax exemptions en-
112. !d. at 80fi. 
11:j. !d. at 807. 
114. !d. 
11fi. !d. at 808. 
116. !d. at 808-809. 
117. !d. at 81:j, 
118. !d. at 814. 
119. !d. 
120. I d. 
121. !d. at 8lfi. 
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abled it to attract and keep qualified employees. 122 Secondly, 
The State argued that federal pension benefits were substan-
tially more generous than those of the State, and therefore 
unequal treatment was justified.123 
Justice Kennedy dealt with these two arguments by first 
pointing out that traditional equal protection analysis was 
"inappropriate" in this context. 124 In cases involving inter-
governmental tax immunity, "'the Government's interests must 
be weighed in the balance."'125 The test in these types of cas-
es is "whether the inconsistent tax treatment is directly related 
to, and justified by, 'significant differences between the two 
classes."'126 The first difference alleged by the State, its inter-
est in having qualified employees, was simply a rational reason 
for discriminating. 127 It did not go at all to the question of 
whether the classes were in fact significantly different. The 
second alleged difference, the relatively parsimonious nature of 
state retirement benefits, would also not justify the inconsis-
tent tax treatment. If the exemption were directly related to 
this difference, the statute "would not discriminate on the basis 
of the source of ... benefits ... ; rather, it would discriminate 
on the basis of the amount of benefits received by individual re-
tirees."128 Therefore, the Court concluded that the Michigan 
tax "violate[ d) principles of intergovernmental tax immunity by 
favoring retired state and local government employees over 
retired federal employees."129 The case was then remanded 
with a "mandate of equal treatment."130 Michigan could pro-
spectively cure the constitutional violation either by extending 
the exemption to all retirees, or by eliminating it entirely, or 
more narrowly, by simply exempting federal retirement bene-
fits to the same extent that those of state and local govern-
ments were exempted. 131 
The proposed linking of tax-exempt status of that percent-
age of funds designated as permissible by the states for ETis 
122. ld. at 816. 
12:1. Jd. 
124. Jd. 
125. ld. (quoting Philips Chern. Co. v. Dumas Indep. School Dist., ~j6l U.S. 876, 
88fi (1960)). 
126. ld. (quoting Philips, 861 U.S. at 888-85 (emphasis added)). 
127. ld. 
128. Id. at 817. 
129. ld. 
130. ld. (quoting Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984)). 
131. ld. at 818. 
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would operate best if applied to all public pension funds to the 
extent permitted by the laws that govern them. Public pension 
funds are different from private pension funds since public 
funds do have guarantors in the taxpaying public. The current 
interpretation of the intergovernmental tax immunity prohibits 
the federal government from taxing the states directly. 132 Uti-
lizing the taxing power to assist a state in regulating and pro-
moting ETis by public pension plans is not a direct tax on the 
states by the federal government. The federal government 
would be merely assisting states in achieving goals they have 
already declared as laudable. However, by linking the tax-ex-
empt status of a percentage of public funds permitted or re-
quired by states for ETis would increase ETI investment. Such 
regulatory appeal was not deemed constitutionally offensive in 
Garcia where it was conceded that the effect of the legislation 
would be to eliminate the issuance of bearer bonds. 133 The 
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity would not create 
an insurmountable hurdle to the proposed legislation. States 
need new initiatives in order to increase the availability of 
capital needed to maintain a strong economy. 
There are recent examples of the intervention of the feder-
al government into the affairs of an entity in distress. The 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has set up an 
unwritten policy "called 'too big to fail' - since it bailed out 
Continental Illinois in 1984."134 This policy was exercised 
when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) gave special 
treatment to big depositors at Bank of New England in Bos-
ton.135 
If the Federal Government, through the FDIC, is unwilling 
to allow "big banks" to fail it is unlikely that it would allow 
states to fail with public pension fund assets in excess of $362 
billion. 136 It has been proposed that if the banks are to be 
rescued then the government should more strictly regulate the 
industry. 137 Likewise if public pension funds would be res-
1:32. Comment, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term: Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 14:3, 222 (198R). 
1:3:3. Id. at 224. 
1:34. Dennis Auchon, FDIC Draws Fire (or Backing BNE's Uninsured Depositors, 
USA ToDAY, Jan. 8, 1991, 2B. 
1:35. Id. 
1:36. Ring, supra note 2, at 21. The study covers 77 public pension funds in 40 
states and Puerto Rico. 
187. Tresury Department Draft Bill, The Financial Institutions Reform. Recovery, 
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cued it is reasonable to regulate their investment. The House 
Banking Committee stated that "more than $50 billion in tax-
payer funds will be needed [to bailout the industry ]."138 It 
would undoubtedly be just as costly for the Federal Govern-
ment, and in turn taxpayers, to bailout states and consequently 
public pension funds. If a state's economy ends in financial ruin 
this would mean that the public pension fund would also be 
bankrupt in the sense that it could no longer meet its financial 
obligations. On December 9, 1975, President Gerald Ford 
signed legislation authorizing the federal government to loan 
New York City $2.3 billion annually until June 30, 1978.139 
Prior to the passage of the bill New York was expected to de-
fault on payment of loans due December 11 if they did not re-
ceive the federal funds. 140 In October, New York had also 
been rescued from financial doom by the pension funds of a 
teachers' union. 141 
Under ordinary circumstances, the puritans would be right to 
insist that the city go through the wringer to pay for 10 years 
of fiscal mismanagement and the well-intentioned but foolish 
attempt to redistribute income by providing expensive servic-
es when it did not have the resources. But ... such a purge 
could start a financial panic. 142 
As a condition of the federal loans, Congress placed numerous 
restrictions and demands upon New York City, New York State 
and their officials. "The city would be required to balance its 
budget within two or three years. To insure that city finances 
are in order, the State would be expected to monitor city 
spending, revenue and bookkeeping."143 
The federal government has an interest in ensuring that all 
pension plans operate to provide bona fide protection for citi-
zens in their retirements. That can be ensured only if the 
state's economy is healthy. It might be wise to thwart potential 
disaster before it begins by requiring some federal regulation of 
and Enforcement Act uf 1989, DAILY REP. EXEC. (BNA), Feh. lfi, 1989. 
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public pension investment in ETis. 
Appropriate legislation could require that the fixed per-
centage of public pension funds required or permitted by states 
to be invested in ETI should be done as a quid pro quo for 
continued tax-exempt status of that percentage, with an appro-
priate amendment to IRC Section 401(a) to accommodate these 
ETis as they relate to public pension plans. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
ETis should be the subject of a federal policy reflected in 
amendments to Section 401(a) which both links the tax-exempt 
status of the portion of public funds permitted or required by 
states to be invested in ETis and relaxes the exclusive benefit 
rule embodied in the Code, for this purpose. In addition to the 
certainty that the proposed amendments to existing legislation 
would create, there are efficiency gains inherent in federal 
legislation that has uniform applicability. Current state stat-
utes should more explicitly accommodate these types of invest-
ments by public pension funds by stating the level of sacrifice 
that can be tolerated in their return, since it is unreasonable to 
expect that all ETis should produce market returns at all 
times. The long term benefit of the investment may outweigh 
any immediate sacrifice in the return. The linking of tax ex-
emption to the portion of public funds required or permitted by 
the states for ETis will promote the investment in ETis to the 
levels permitted and hopefully impact on states economies. 
Beneficiaries and retirees will be protected against the tax 
consequences of possible violations of the exclusive benefit rule 
if ETis receive specific accommodation within the fiduciary 
rules. Fiduciaries of public trust funds would also be immu-
nized from the full panoply of legal, equitable and injunctive 
relief available for violation of their duties. 
